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Can the Life Insurance Market Provide Evidence for a Bequest
Motive?
Abstract
Using U.K. microeconomic data, we analyze the empirical determinants
of participation in the life insurance market. We nd that term insurance
demand is positively correlated with measures of bequest motives like being
married, having children and/or subjective measures of strong bequest motives.
We then show that a life-cycle model of life insurance demand, saving and
portfolio choice can rationalize quantitatively the data in the presence of a
bequest motive. These ndings provide evidence supporting the presence of a
bequest motive.
JEL Classication: E21, G11.
Key Words: Portfolio choice, life insurance, bequest motive.
1 Introduction
The strength of the bequest motive has been a source of intense debate in the
last thirty years. A classic exchange between Kotliko¤ and Summers (1981)
and Modigliani (1988) gives a range for the amount of wealth in the economy
accounted for by bequests between 46% by the former and the much smaller
17% by the latter. A large empirical literature has tried to come to a satisfac-
tory answer with regards to the strength of the bequest motive. In a widely
cited paper Hurd (1987) argues against the presence of a bequest motive by
comparing the wealth decumulation of households with and without children.
If households with and without children behave in a similar way, then that
observation can be interpreted as evidence that the intentional bequest motive
is not present.
Recent work has called into question this conclusion using a more struc-
tural approach towards estimation (Kopczuk and Lupton (2007)). A parallel
literature from macroeconomics has recently argued that bequest motives are
needed to explain the very skewed wealth distribution observed in U.S. data.
Prominent examples of this work include De Nardi (2004), Castaneda et al.
(2003) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006).
We revisit the evidence on the strength of the bequest motive through life
insurance participation and portfolio choices using a detailed survey of U.K
elderly households. The spirit of our exercise is similar to Bernheim (1991)
who uses life insurance data to make the case for bequests. Brown (2001), on
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the other hand, questions these conclusions because life insurance data might
be mixing di¤erent types of products, or because some of the households might
still be working and be covered by their employers or because of cohort e¤ects.
We broaden this earlier analysis by breaking down life insurance participation
between one arising from tax-reasons and another one more closely linked to
bequests. We also focus on retired households, thereby addressing the possi-
bility of employer-provided life insurance as an explanation for observed life
insurance purchases. We then provide microeconometric evidence on the de-
terminants of life insurance participation using this new data set. Finally,
we estimate the preference parameters of a life insurance and asset alloca-
tion model and show how a bequest motive can explain observed outcomes.
Our analysis therefore makes the case that life insurance and asset allocation
choices can provide empirical support for the presence of a bequest motive.
We proceed in a number of steps in making this case. We rst empirically
analyze the determinants of life insurance demand at the household level to
determine the characteristics of households that participate (or not) in this
market. Our data contain information on term insurance and endowment
plans. The latter essentially combine a term insurance with an investment
component. We nd that 42% of households participate in the life insurance
market, 35% in term insurance and 7% in endowment plans. Our empirical re-
sults support the interpretation that endowment plans are held for investment
purposes due to tax reasons, while term insurance participation is strongly cor-
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related with variables proxying for a bequest motive (being married, having
children and stating a subjective preference for leaving bequests).
In our empirical analysis, we also separate the sample between stockholders
and non-stockholders. We take this route because wealthier and more educated
households can better a¤ord and understand nancial products, and because
we know that stock market participation increases with wealth and education
(for instance, Campbell (2006)). We nd that stockholders are more likely to
invest in endowment plans than non-stockholders (11% vs 4%) but less likely to
demand term insurance (29% vs 39%), with the di¤erences being statistically
signicant.
Given this empirical evidence, our working hypothesis will be that an op-
erational bequest motive can be consistent with term insurance choices in
household portfolios. We therefore construct a quantitative model that may
replicate these empirical ndings. Specically, we build a model of life-cycle
saving, portfolio and life insurance choices with Epstein and Zin (1989) prefer-
ences over a non-durable good and investigate whether reasonable preference
parameters can replicate the observed term insurance participation rate, the
wealth proles and asset allocations after retirement. We use a Method of
Simulated Moments to estimate the model separately for stockholders and
non-stockholders due to the large di¤erence in nancial wealth proles across
the two groups in the data.1
1We do not model the endogenous decision of whether to participate or not in the stock
market. Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and Sule (2006) calibrate and estimate, respectively,
a life-cycle model and show that households with low nancial wealth can be kept out of
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The estimated preference parameters require a low elasticity of intertempo-
ral substitution for both non-stockholders and stockholders (around 0:3) and
this estimate is within the range o¤ered by the empirical evidence in Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002). We also estimate the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
between 4:2 and 6, while the discount factor ranges between 0:9 and 0:98.
For both stockholders and non-stockholders, we need a bequest motive to ex-
plain the data, with the bequest motive stronger for stockholders (consistent
with the interpretation in De Nardi et al. (2010)). We view these parameter
estimates as plausible and interpret our results as being consistent with the
presence of a bequest motive.
Apart from explaining life insurance demands, the bequest motive can also
generate a balanced portfolio comprised of both stocks and bonds and therefore
can better explain portfolio allocations during retirement. Here, the bequest
motive can generate a much slower decumulation of wealth during retirement,
while for the same reason it can generate balanced portfolios. In the absence of
a bequest motive, both nancial wealth and the implicit riskless assets (state
pensions) are being depleted at similar rates. A bequest motive, however, slows
down the decumulation of nancial wealth while the present value of pensions
(the implicit riskless asset) is being depleted at the same rate with or without
a bequest motive. As a result, the intentional bequest motive generates a
the stock market with a small xed cost. Given that in our data the households that do
not participate in the stock market are much poorer in terms of nancial wealth than stock
market participants, we think that a small xed cost will keep these households out of the
stock market as well. We do not model this endogenous choice explicitly here to keep the
model relatively simple.
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stronger demand for the riskless nancial asset generating a balanced portfolio
even at retirement and in the presence of a substantial equity premium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present
multivariate Probit (reduced form) results on the actual determinants of life
insurance demand. In Section 3 we outline the model of household choices
during retirement and in Section 4 we estimate the structural parameters of
this model and compare the moments in the data to the ones from the model.
Section 5 discusses the implications of the model for the bequest motive and
performs some robustness checks and Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Analysis
In this section we investigate the correlates of participation in the life insurance
market using a sample of elderly households for the U.K.
2.1 Dataset
The empirical part of the paper is based on the English Longitudinal Study of
Ageing (ELSA). ELSA is a biannual panel survey among those aged 50 and
over (and their younger partners) living in private households in England. We
are using the rst wave of ELSA collected in 2002=03. Since we are interested
in identifying bequest motives in our sample, we restrict our analysis to elderly
households dened as consisting of a retired single, or a couple with at least
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one retired person.2 We exclude 684 households with outstanding mortgages
to remove life insurance holdings which might have been imposed by the mort-
gage seller and therefore can not be interpreted as resulting from a voluntary
decision of the household.3 Some further details regarding the construction of
the sample are provided in Appendix A.
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
2.2.1 Life Insurance Holdings
Households participating in ELSA are requested to report holdings of any life
insurance policies. If conrmed, households are asked to indicate if the life
insurance has a savings componentdened as the value of the fund that
will be paid at some point in the future.This question separates term insur-
ance without an investment component from endowment plans which combine
term insurance with an investment component. In an endowment plan, the ac-
cumulated amount of insurance premiums and reinvested returns are invested
(usually on behalf of the owner of the contract) and returns are distributed to
the life insurance account of the owner. If she is alive at the plans maturity
date, the owner of an endowment plan will receive the value of the fund. In
contrast to this, a term insurance does not pay out anything if the insurance
holder is alive at the maturity of the contract. The reasons for choosing an
2With this restriction, we exclude 2,206 non-retired households.
3In the U.K., is is not mandatory by law to combine a mortgage with a life insurance.
However, mortgage sellers still may require this.
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endowment plan in favour of alternative investments like mutual funds are tax-
related. Appendix B gives more details on the di¤erent types of life insurance
holdings in the U.K. and overviews their tax treatment.
Table 1 reports a 42% participation rate in the life insurance market in our
sample. This number is close to the aggregate life insurance participation rate
of 47% reported for the U.K. by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) for
the year 2004.4 Table 1 (last row) further reports that 35% of the households
in our sample hold a term insurance, while 7% invest in an endowment plan.
2.2.2 Life Insurance, Stock Market Participation, and Financial
Wealth
Table 1 also decomposes the total sample into stock market participants and
non-participants (also called stockholders and non-stockholders from now on).5
The stock market participation rate is 42% but the di¤erence in total life insur-
ance holdings of stockholders (41%) and non-stockholders (44%) is small and
statistically insignicant. However, there are much more pronounced and sta-
tistically signicant di¤erences in the various types of life insurance products.
Stockholders are less likely than non-stockholders to hold a term insurance
4See the ABI publication UK Insurance - Key Facts 2005 available from
http://www.abi.org.uk. According to ABI, the average annual premium per household is
£ 807 and the total premium income of the life insurance industry is £ 31 billion. These
numbers indicate that life insurance holdings are an important component of the portfolio
of an average household in the U.K.
5A stock market participant is dened as a household that has stocks in an individual
savings account (ISA), or a personal equity plan (PEP), or indirect stock holdings in an
investment trust, or direct holdings of stocks. Indirect holdings in occupational of private
pension schemes are not accounted for. Savings-related forms of life-insurance holdings are
excluded as well because we do not observe the allocation in the underlying investment unit
(which we need for the matching exercise later in the paper).
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(29% vs 39%) but more likely to hold an endowment plan (11% vs 4%). This
conrms the view that endowment plans are predominantly seen as an invest-
ment. They are more attractive to stockholders, who are usually more wealthy
and possess a higher level of nancial sophistication than non-stockholders (see,
e.g., Campbell (2006)).
Table 2 shows life insurance holdings and stock market participation rates
across the wealth distribution. As expected, stock market participation in-
creases monotonically with nancial wealth and reaches 78% for the group of
households with nancial wealth exceeding £ 50; 000. Similarly, investments
in endowment plans increase monotonically with nancial wealth but partic-
ipation rates remain relatively modest (14% for the most wealthy group of
households). On the other hand, term insurance holdings monotonically de-
crease with nancial wealth and reach a minimum of 25% for the most wealthy
households.
2.2.3 Life Insurance and Bequest Motives
Table 3 reports life insurance participation rates for households with a possibly
operational bequest motive. These households are either married, and/or with
children and/or reporting a positive probability of leaving a bequest. These cor-
relates for bequests have been previously discussed in the literature. Auerbach
and Kotliko¤ (1991) discuss the important role of life insurance for securing
an adequate consumption level of widows. Correspondingly, Bernheim et al.
(2003) and Inkmann et al. (2011) suggest that a bequest motive may result
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from being married. Children are used as a proxy for a bequest motive by Hurd
(1987) and Hurd (1989). Subjective bequest probabilities are investigated by
Hurd and Smith (1999) who provide evidence that these probabilities are valid
predictors of actual bequests.
It turns out that married households hold signicantly larger amounts of all
life insurance forms. Households with children hold signicantly more term in-
surance than households without children (37% vs 27%) but the same amount
of endowment plans (7%). Households reporting a positive probability of leav-
ing a bequest are less (more) likely to have a term insurance (endowment plan)
than households reporting a zero bequest probability. The negative correlation
between reporting a positive bequest probability and term insurance holdings
seems surprising but one should bear in mind that these statistics are un-
conditional. The multivariate analysis presented below will explore if these
correlations persist once other covariates like nancial wealth are controlled
for.
Table 3 also relates the three proxies for intentional bequests to the self-
reported, expected life insurance payout. All three groups indicating a possible
bequest motive expect signicantly higher life insurance payouts. The di¤er-
ence is particularly strong for households reporting a positive probability of
leaving a bequest. These households on average expect a life insurance payout
of about £ 5; 800 compared to about £ 1; 800 for households not expecting to
leave a bequest.
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2.2.4 Life Insurance Covariates
Table 4 shows averages for a number of covariates for the whole sample and
the subsamples of households holding a life insurance, a term insurance, an
endowment plan or stocks. Interestingly, it should rst be noted that the
characteristics of households owning endowment plans are similar to those
that participate in the stock market (they are wealthier and more educated
relative to the average (last column)).
The value of life insurance increases with a decreasing survival probability.
The questionnaire asks individuals of age less than, or equal to, 65 (69, 74,
79, 84 and 89) What are the chances that you will live to be 75 (80, 85, 90,
95 and 100, respectively) or more?and gives a range from 0  100 for possi-
ble answers. We compare these subjective survival probabilities with gender-
and age-specic objectivesurvival probabilities from the Government Actu-
arys Department (GAD).6 Hurd and McGarry (1995) and Hurd and McGarry
(2002) show for the U.S. that subjective probabilities tend to aggregate well
to population probabilities. Table 4 conrms this nding for all subsamples.
Individuals buying a term insurance report substantially lower survival prob-
abilities than individuals buying an endowment plan. This can be seen as
additional evidence that term insurance is purchased with a bequest motive in
mind.
Table 4 also reports average pension income for the di¤erent subsamples.
6Available from www.gad.gov.uk.
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Households with endowment plans or stocks on average have more pension
income than households with a term insurance (about £ 12; 000 vs £ 9; 000).
Moreover, the average unconditional expected life insurance payout is about
£ 5; 500. Conditional on owning a life insurance policy, the average life in-
surance payout is about £ 12; 900, while the expected payout is larger for
endowment plans (£ 18; 400) than for term insurance contracts (£ 11; 800).
2.3 Econometric Analysis
Table 5 contains the results from Probit estimations of the decision to partic-
ipate in the life insurance market. The table reports the estimated marginal
e¤ects for the Probit models which are computed for a baseline of a single, 65
year-old, male with medium education, no children, a self-reported zero prob-
ability of leaving a bequest, with average survival probability, log pension, and
log nancial wealth.
According to Table 5, life insurance holdings decrease with age (driven by
endowment plans), while education signicantly a¤ects the decision to buy
a term insurance but is insignicant for savings-related products. Compared
to the baseline category of medium education, a household with low educa-
tion has a 3:1 percentage point higher probability of holding a term insurance.
Regarding the three proxies for a possible bequest motive - being married,
having children, and reporting a positive probability of leaving a bequest - we
nd very clear support for the hypothesis that term insurance contracts are
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related to intended bequests while endowment plans are unrelated. All three
proxy variables turn out to be economically and statistically highly signicant
predictors of the decision to hold a term insurance but are insignicant for
the decision to invest in endowment plans. Compared to the single baseline
household, a married household shows a 7:1 percentage point higher participa-
tion probability in the term insurance market. The corresponding percentages
for having children and reporting a positive bequest probability are both 4:9
percentage points. The results for the subjective survival probabilities conrm
the impression that term insurance policies are held for bequest motives. A
10 percentage point decrease in the subjective survival probability of the base-
line household, increases the participation in term insurance by 0:5 percentage
points.
While pension income does not matter for any form of life insurance hold-
ings, nancial wealth is highly signicant for all forms. The sign of the wealth
coe¢ cient, however, is di¤erent for the two forms of life insurance: negative
for term insurance and positive for endowment plans. This conrms our de-
scriptive statistics in Table 2. A unit increase in log nancial wealth, which
roughly corresponds to a 100% increase in the nancial wealth of the baseline
household, decreases participation in the term insurance market by 3:2 per-
centage points, but increases demand for endowment plans by 1:7 percentage
points.
Table 6 shows estimation results from a loglinear regression of expected life
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insurance payouts conditional on participation in the life insurance market.
Financial wealth is a strong positive predictor for both forms of life insurance
demand but the life insurance demand elasticity of wealth is much higher for
endowment plans (0:3375) than for term insurance (0:0971). Moreover, we nd
a highly signicant negative e¤ect of age in all three regressions. Conditional on
participation, the demand for life insurance is a¤ected by the same variables
a¤ecting the demand for stocks (see Campbell (2006)). The participation
decision, however, is di¤erent from other nancial markets, in particular for
term insurance. This is conrmed by the results for the three indicators of
a possible bequest motive, which were highly signicant for the decision to
participate in the term insurance market but turn out insignicant for the
conditional life insurance demand. The e¤ect of nancial wealth was also of
the opposite sign for the decision to purchase a term insurance.
2.4 Summary
We provide an in-depth empirical analysis of a households decision to par-
ticipate in the life insurance market. We nd it particularly insightful to
di¤erentiate term insurance holdings from investments in endowment plans.
The latter attract households with the same characteristics as those invest-
ing in the stock market, and nancial wealth becomes a key characteristic
inuencing decisions.
Term insurance is bought for completely di¤erent purposes. Participation
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signicantly decreases with nancial wealth. Moreover, all variables proxying a
households bequest motive are economically and statistically highly signicant
predictors for participation in the term insurance market. Furthermore, we
show that term insurance policies are bought by individuals reporting a low
survival probability and having lower education. We view all of these ndings
as very strong evidence for the hypothesis that term insurance policies are
bought by the relatively poor households for bequest purposes.
3 The Model
In the next two sections we investigate the implications of a life-cycle model of
life insurance demand and portfolio choice and assess the models consistency
with the empirical ndings in the previous section.
3.1 Model Setup
3.1.1 Bond and Stock Market
The household can save through a riskless asset and the stock market and
makes decisions at an annual frequency. We use rf to denote the one period
interest rate, ert+1 the random return on the stock market and t the share of
wealth in stocks, and assume that neither stocks nor bonds can be sold short,
therefore t has to lie between zero and one.
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3.1.2 Life Insurance Contracts
Based on our econometric analysis, we focus on the most widely held insurance
product in the ELSA data: term insurance. If the insured person dies before
maturity, then a term insurance pays out the insured sum. If on the other hand
the insured person lives at maturity, then the term insurance plan pays out
nothing. These products usually have a xed term maturity (for instance, ten
years). Even though these policies are typically held until expiry, we can model
the term insurance as a one year product that can be repriced and repurchased
every year to facilitate the numerical solution. At time t; the household can
purchase term life insurance which will pay exp(rf ) at time (t + 1) if death
arrives next period. We allow for uncertainty in the age of death with pt+1
denoting the probability that the household is alive at date t+1, conditional on
being alive at date t. The actuarially fair price of one unit of the life insurance
product is then equal to (1   pt+1)7. We also use a load factor (Pl) to reect
any possible prots or non-actuarial pricing on the part of the life insurance
rm. Therefore, the price of life insurance equals
lt = (1 + Pl)(1  pt+1) (1)
7With probability pt+1 survival continues next period and the insurance gives a payout
equal to zero. With probability (1  pt+1) the insurance pays out exp(rf ) next period and
therefore the current expected value of life insurance equals (1  pt+1):
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3.1.3 Budget Constraint
During retirement the household has liquid nancial wealth (cash on hand)
Xt, which can be used to purchase life insurance and save though the bond or
the stock market. The household is also endowed with pension income in each
period, L, but also faces idiosyncratic uncertainty (Yi) in the form of medical
expenses.8 Mainly for simplicity we model Yi as i.i.d., log-normal with variance
equal to 2Y and mean equal to  0:52Y .9 The household can purchase only
positive amounts of the life insurance product. At time t (in the most general
version of the model), there are two state variables (age and cash on hand)
and three control variables (consumption/saving, the share of wealth in stocks
(t), and the share of wealth allocated to the life insurance product (lt)).
Cash on hand evolves according to
Xt+1 = (Xt   Ct)(1  lt)[t exp(ert+1) + (1  t) exp(rf )] + LYi (2)
If the individual dies in period t + 1, then next period cash on hand is aug-
mented by the life insurance payout which equals lt(Xt   Ct) exp(rf )=lt but
8De Nardi et al. (2010) emphasize the role of idiosyncratic uncertainty during retirement.
It is di¢ cult to map the U.S. data to U.K. equivalents given the di¤erences in medical
systems that might account for a large proportion of idiosyncratic expense uncertainty during
retirement. Out-of-pocket medical expenditures are also typically found to follow a persistent
process in the U.S. data. Rather than complicating the model further we use an i.i.d. process
with a high variance to compensate for the lack of serial correlation in this uncertainty.
Robustness checks are performed with regards to this value.
9As in the precautionary savings literature this ensures that changing the variance of the
shock does not a¤ect the mean of Y:
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the household does not receive a pension in that instance.
3.1.4 Preferences
We model household saving and portfolio choices from retirement onwards at
an annual frequency. The household lives for a maximum of T (35) periods
after retirement. Household preferences are then described by the Epstein-Zin
(1989) utility function:
Vt =

(1  )C1 1= t + 
 
Et(pt+1V
1 
t+1 + (1  pt+1)b1(b2 +Xt+1)1 )
 1 1= 
1 
 1
1 1= 
(3)
where  is the time discount factor, b1 is the strength of the bequest motive,  
is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and  is the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion. The parameter b2 allows for a threshold bequest motive
as discussed by Lockwood (2009). b2 describes the threshold wealth level below
which a houshold leaves no bequest.
The specication of the bequest motive is potentially a controversial issue
in (3). Cocco (2005) and Yogo (2008) make a similar assumption with b2 = 0,
while Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) assume that utility from leaving a bequest
is linear in wealth. Our specication is closest to De Nardi (2004) in functional
form but separates risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion. The state variables in each period are current cash on hand and age. In
each period t, t = 1; :::; T , the household chooses optimal consumption Ct and
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the shares of saving allocated to the stock market (t) and the life insurance
product (lt) with all shares being between zero and one.
3.1.5 Wealth Distribution and Pension Income
To eventually compare the predictions of the model with the data, we will feed
certain exogenous inputs from the data in the model. The main ones are an
initial wealth distribution and a reasonable pension level. At the same time,
based on our empirical results, we also condition these exogenous inputs on
stock market participation status and solve two di¤erent models, one in which
stock market participation is allowed and another where it is not, therefore re-
quiring di¤erent inputs for wealth and pension income depending on the stock
market participation status. We make this choice following the literature that
has shown that wealth and stock market participation are positively correlated
and that, to a rst approximation, non-stockholders are poorer than stockhold-
ers so that a small xed cost of participation can keep non-stockholders out
of the stock market either in innite horizon or nite horizon models (see, for
example, Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), Gomes and Michaelides (2005),
Sule (2006) or the evidence summarized in Guiso et al. (2002) and Camp-
bell (2006)). This assumption is consistent with our data with mean nancial
wealth at retirement for stockholders being approximately ve times the mean
wealth of non-stockholders.10 Using these exogenous inputs we start a simula-
10Median wealth di¤erences are similarly extreme with median wealth for non-stockholders
being 5; 000 GBP, while median wealth for stockholders equalling 49; 000 GBP. It should also
be noted that this data set does not oversample the rich (like the U.S. Survey of Consumer
Finances). We therefore expect the di¤erences in the actual population to be even more
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tion from age 65 onwards and for each age compute the average life insurance
participation rate, average portfolio demand and nancial wealth.11
4 Matching the Data
We estimate the structural parameters of the life-cycle model with the goal to
match the age proles of term life insurance participation, demand conditional
on participation, nancial wealth and the share of wealth allocated to stocks
generated from the model with the data.
4.1 Estimation Method
We will use a Method of Simulated Moments proposed by Du¢ e and Singleton
(1993) to estimate the model. The structural parameters ^ are determined as:
^ = ArgminD
0S 1D:
Let Yt and ~Yt denote the observations at time t of the actual and simulated
endogenous variables, respectively. Let T be the sample size of the observed
series whereas TH data points are simulated to compute moments from the
extreme than the ones noted in ELSA.
11To compute aggregate statistics we derive the demographic weights that would be im-
plied by the survival probabilities used by the household. We then weight each cohort by
the respective demographic weight. The conditional survival probabilities are taken from
the U.K. GAD for 2002-2004.
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structural model. We have:
D =
 
1
T
TX
t=1
moment(Yt)  1
TH
THX
t=1
moment( ~Yt)
!
:
The asymptotically e¢ cient optimal weighting matrix S 1 equals the in-
verse of the variance-covariance matrix of the data. Following Appendix B in
De Nardi et al. (2010), we use a diagonal weighting matrix for S 1 with the
elements along the diagonals being the variance of each moment.
We need to determine which moments to choose. For the non-stockholders
we pick nancial wealth accumulation, term life insurance participation rates
and the expected term insurance payout conditional on participation over ve
year age intervals (giving a total of fteen moments). For stockholders we use
the same moments, also adding the share of wealth in stocks, giving a total of
twenty moments.
4.2 Solution Technique and Calibrated Parameters
This problem cannot be solved analytically. Given the nite nature of the
problem a solution exists and can be obtained by backward induction, the
numerical Appendix C o¤ers some details on the solution method. There
is a large number of parameters to choose and we follow standard practice
in calibrating some parameters to maintain the tractability of the estimation
method. The maximum age that can be reached is 100, but agents will face
a probability of death each period. We assume a constant interest rate equal
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to 2%. For the stockholders, the mean equity premium is set at 4% with a
standard deviation of 20%. The standard deviation (Y ) of the i.i.d. shocks
during retirement is set at 0:3, but we provide sensitivity analysis to this choice.
The mean pension levels are constant. For stockholders they are set at £ 11; 899
per annum and for non-stockholders they are equal to £ 7; 711. Life insurance
policies are assumed to be actuarially unfair. We set Pl = 0:2 and, for the
lack of other evidence, we use the upper range of the estimated loads from the
annuity market found in Mitchell et al. (1999) but we also provide robustness
checks to this value. To start simulating nancial wealth life histories based on
the solved policy functions, the initial nancial wealth distribution from the
data at age 65 is used to start the process.
4.3 Results for Non-stockholders
The results for the non-stockholders are given in Table 7. There is evidence for
a weak bequest motive (b1 = 0:02) and no evidence for a threshold nancial
wealth (b2 = 0:0). The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is estimated to
be relatively low ( = 0:33), consistent with the estimates in Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002). Risk aversion is estimated at 4:22 which is within the range of recent
estimates (see the discussion in De Nardi et. al. (2010)). Non-stockholders are
relatively impatient with the discount factor at 0:9, which is within the range
of empirical plausibility (see, for instance, the recent paper by Love (2010)).
Figure 1, left hand panel, compares the predictions of the model with the
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data and illustrates that the model makes plausible predictions about the data.
The mean life insurance participation is relatively constant throughout retire-
ment and mean nancial wealth declines only gradually during retirement.
The term insurance payout also declines during retirement and also matches
the data.
4.4 Results for Stockholders
The results for the stockholders are given again in Table 7. There is evidence for
a strong bequest motive (b1 = 5:62) but not for a threshold wealth level (b2 =
0). The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is estimated at around the
same level as for non-stockholders ( = 0:3) which is slightly at odds with the
literature that nds higher elasticities for wealthier households (for instance,
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)). Nevertheless, there are two main di¤erences in the
current setup relative to empirical estimates based on Euler equations. First,
the discount factor is estimated to be much higher for stockholders than for
non-stockholders (0:98 versus 0:90), and the discount factor also a¤ects saving
behavior. Second, the bequest motive is estimated to be much stronger for
stockholders than for non-stockholders and this parameter also a¤ects saving
behavior. Typical estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution keep
both the discount factor and the bequest motive implicitly the same across
groups and this might be a¤ecting the nal results.
The risk aversion coe¢ cient needs to be estimated slightly higher than
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the one for non-stockholders ( = 6 vs  = 4:22) reecting the presence
of the equity premium: to generate balanced portfolios a slightly higher risk
aversion is needed for stockholders. A stronger bequest motive is also necessary
to prevent decumulation of nancial wealth during retirement. It should be
noted that the estimated bequest motive being stronger for richer households
is consistent with the recent work by De Nardi et. al. (2010) whose ndings
can be interpreted in a similar way.
Figure 1, right hand panel, compares the model predictions with the data.
Life insurance participation is slightly decreasing during the later retirement
period and the model generates this prediction. Mean nancial wealth is also
predicted to be relatively constant during retirement (hence the need for a
bequest motive) while the share of wealth in stocks is slightly higher than in
the data in the early retirement period. The strong bequest motive also helps to
keep the portfolio being balanced between bonds and stocks despite the equity
premium. This arises because the rapid decumulation of the implicit riskless
asset in the form of pensions means that the portfolio can be kept relatively
balanced by replenishing the loss of pensions with the nancial riskless asset.
The mean term insurance payout decreases during retirement whereas it shows
an upward trend in the data (but the standard deviation of this variable is
substantial in the data).
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5 Robustness Results
If the bequest parameter b1 is set equal to zero then there is no participation in
the life insurance market. Thus, if the intentional bequest motive is eliminated,
the model needs to be extended in di¤erent directions if life insurance demands
are to be rationalized. We therefore interpret the results from the baseline
model as providing supportive evidence for the presence of a bequest motive
through the life insurance market.
We next perform some comparative statics to better understand the work-
ing of the model. Table 8 reports the baseline results for non-stockholders.
The column Y = 0reduces idiosyncratic uncertainty to 0% and shows that
life insurance participation dramatically increases. On the other hand, the
column Y = 0:9presents what happens when idiosyncratic uncertainty in-
creases from Y = 0:3 to Y = 0:9 and shows that life insurance participation
is almost completely driven to zero. Why drives these results? Higher idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty implies that savings for precautionary reasons increase and
the extra savings can be used either for precautionary or bequest reasons in
case of death. With zero idiosyncratic uncertainty, on the other hand, the need
for precautionary saving is less pronounced and the household nds it cheaper
to satisfy the bequest motive through the life insurance market. Thus, perhaps
counterintuitively, the model predicts that the presence of very high idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty that generates a lot of precautionary saving, can actually
crowd out the life insurance market.
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Decreasing the load factor from 20% (Pl = 0:2) to zero (column Pl = 0)
does not generate a substantial change in results early in retirement but does
generate a substantial increase towards the end of life (for the fth age group,
life insurance participation increases from 26 to 69 percent). The nal column,
0:5L, decreases the xed pension received during retirement by 50%. This
does have a substantial e¤ect on life insurance participation choices and at
rst sight these look counterintuitive. Specically, life insurance participation
is reduced in the presence of lower pension payouts. It seems the bequest
motive is more likely to be important when the household rst satises its own
consumption needs, and a lower pension makes these needs more pressing,
crowding out life insurance demand.
Table 9 repeats the same experiments for stockholders. Eliminating idio-
syncratic uncertainty (column Y = 0) for this richer group has less of an
e¤ect on life insurance demand and wealth decumulation, even though the ef-
fects go in the same way as for non-stockholders (more wealth decumulation
and higher life insurance participation). The e¤ects are more dramatic with
the large increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty from Y = 0:3 to Y = 0:9 (col-
umn Y = 0:9). Due to the higher wealth accumulation for precautionary
reasons, life insurance demand is almost completely crowded out as the house-
hold can use the accumulated savings from self insurance to satisfy the bequest
motive in case of death. The e¤ect on portfolio choice is consistent with the
temperance e¤ect: higher income uncertainty is predicted to reduce the share
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of wealth allocated to the stock market. Using actuarially fair life insurance
(column Pl = 0) increases demand for life insurance and this is mostly seen
by the higher life insurance payout at di¤erent age groups. Setting the pen-
sion level to 50 percent of the previous level (column 0:5L) again crowds
out life insurance participation. This happens because the household feels it
should satisfy its own consumption needs rst, as in the non-stockholder case.
We conclude that pension provision and household expectations about pension
payouts are important determinants of life insurance participation.
6 Conclusion
Using microeconomic data from the U.K. we nd that correlates of intentional
bequest motives (being married, having children and/or subjective measures
of preferences towards leaving bequests) are positively correlated with life in-
surance demand for protection (as opposed to tax-favored investment) reasons.
We then estimate preference parameters from a structural model that can ra-
tionalize observed choices of life insurance demand with a plausible preference
parameter conguration. A key requirement is the need for a bequest motive
to explain observed choices. We interpret the results from this analysis as
supportive evidence for the presence of a bequest motive.
Future work should try to determine whether joint nancial decision-making
is what our proxy bequest parameter is capturing. For example, a major con-
tributor for purchasing life insurance might simply be to reallocate consump-
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tion possibilities across di¤erent survival states (in the event a major earner
in the family dies). However, we believe that such a model needs to cover the
whole life cycle because the protection of human capital is particularly im-
portant early in life when human capital is large and children less capable to
fend for themselves. This intuition is conrmed empirically by Lin and Grace
(2007). We therefore think that future research that addresses joint nancial
decisions over the whole of the life cycle is an interesting topic for further
research.
Appendix A The Data12
We prepare the data on the nancial unit level because the Income and As-
setsmodule of ELSA is distributed to all nancial units within a household. A
nancial unit is either a single person, or a couple if the latter declares to share
their income and assets. If a couple treats their income and assets separately,
it will consist of two nancial units. All covariates (like age, gender, education)
are matched to the person answering the Income and Assetsmodule. The
rst wave of ELSA comprises 12; 100 individuals and our sample consists of
4; 422 households. The reduction is explained by excluding households without
a member in retirement (2; 206 observations), excluding partners from couples
12The data (ELSA) were made available through the UK Data Archive. ELSA was devel-
oped by a team of researchers based at the National Centre for Social Research, University
College London and the Institute for Fiscal Studies. The data were collected by the National
Centre for Social Research. The funding is provided by the National Institute of Aging in
the United States, and a consortium of UK government departments coordinated by the
O¢ ce for National Statistics. The developers and funders of ELSA and the Archive do not
bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.
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who report joint income and assets (3; 536 observations), excluding nancial
units with an outstanding mortgage (684 observations), and excluding obser-
vations with missing values for our variables of interest (1; 252 observations).
Appendix B The U.K. Life Insurance Market
The ELSA questionnaire explains that there are two types of life insurance
in the U.K. One type is pure insurance - i.e. the individual gives a company
money each year. If that individual dies the company pays money to their
dependents but if they dont die (before a certain date), the company just
keeps all the money. The other type of life insurance has a savings component
so even if the individual does not die before a certain date they will receive a
sum of money (typically the value of a fund) on that day.The rst type of
life insurance is term insurance. The second type of life insurance is typically
an endowment plan. The ELSA questions are designed to get at both types
of life insurance since we need to know both separately.
The Association of British Insurers distinguishes protection- and savings
related life insurance forms in the U.K.13 Protection-related life insurance can
be used to protect a households future nancial well-being. If the policy
holder passes away during the term of the insurance, the insurance company
pays a prespecied lump sum to the beneciaries of the policy. In return, the
holder of the policy agrees to pay a premium in monthly (or sometimes annual)
13See the ABI publication UK Insurance - Key Facts 2005 available from
http://www.abi.org.uk.
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frequency. A savings-related life insurance policy is an investment product.
The policy holder agrees to pay a premium, which can be of a lump sum type
or paid at regular intervals. Premium payments are pooled by the insurer and
invested. The insurance company pays out the accumulated investment returns
in addition to the prespecied lump sum to the beneciaries of the policy at
the time the owner of the policy dies or the term expires, whichever comes
rst. Investment returns are either distributed when they occur (unit-linked
policies) or smoothed and paid out in terms of a bonus on an annual basis
(with-prot policies). A term insurance is a protection-related life insurance
product while an endowment plan is a savings-related product.
HM Revenue & Customs explains the taxation of savings-related life insur-
ance in the U.K.14 To understand this, it is important to di¤erentiate quali-
fying and non-qualifying policies. Broadly speaking, a qualifying policy (for
example, an endowment plan) requires premium payments at regular intervals
(ruling out single premium policies) and a term of at least 10 years. A non-
qualifying policy (for example, an investment bond) is a single premium policy
with a term of at least 5 years. Income and gains from both forms of policies
are taxed at 20% at source. High-rate tax payers pay an additional 20% tax on
income and gains on non-qualifying policies. However, non-qualifying policies
allow the owner to withdraw 5% of the amount invested in each year before
the policy matures without immediate taxation consequences. Taxation is de-
ferred to the time the policy expires. This can be attractive for households
14Help sheet 320 available from http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/helpsheets/hs320.pdf.
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expecting a lower tax rate at the maturity of the contract. Qualifying policies
become non-qualifying if cashed in or if premium payments are interrupted
either before 10 years or 75% of the term have passed, whichever comes rst.
Qualifying policies with a long term of, for example, 25 years are also sold in
combination with a mortgage (endowment mortgage). Insurance policies can
also be placed in an individual savings account (ISA). In this case, neither the
insurance company nor the owner need to pay tax on income or capital gains.15
However, the maximum amount of premiums paid to an ISA life insurance is
limited.
For comparison, during the time our data is collected (2002/03), a high-
(low-) rate tax payer would need to pay 40% (20%) capital gains tax on mutual
funds. There is a taper relieffor assets that were held for a long time which
reduces the tax to a minimum of 24% (12%) for high (low-) rate tax payers.16
This comparison shows that there are tax incentives, in particular for high-
rate tax payers, to invest in savings-related life insurance like endowment plans.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the proceeds of a life insurance are subject
to 40% inheritance tax if the total estate exceeds the inheritance threshold (£
250; 000 in 2002/03). However, this can be avoided if the policy is written in
trust.
15ELSA contains information on life insurance holdings in ISA accounts. We classify these
as savings-related. Thus, they are included in the endowment plan category.
16Since April 2008, the capital gains tax has been 18% at.
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Appendix C Numerical Solution
There are two state variables (age and cash on hand) and three control variables
(consumption, share of wealth in stocks, and share of wealth in life insurance
for bequest reasons) in the most general version of the model. The household
problem is therefore given by
Vt(Xt) =MAX
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t;lt
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where the evolution of the state variable is given in (2).
We solve the model recursively backwards17 starting from the last period.
In the last period (t = T ) the policy functions are trivial and the value function
corresponds to the bequest function. We need to solve for three control vari-
ables in every year. For every age t prior to T , and for each point in the state
space, we optimize using grid search. From the Bellman equation the optimal
decisions are given as current utility plus the discounted expected continuation
value (EtVt+1(:)), which we can compute since we have just obtained Vt+1. We
perform all numerical integrations using Gaussian quadrature to approximate
the distributions of the innovations to the risky asset returns. We discretize
the state-space along the continuous state variable and use cubic splines to
perform the interpolation of the value function for points which do not lie on
17We use a value function approach to solve the problem (unlike Zeng (2008) who uses an
Euler equation approach).
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the state space grid, with more points used at lower levels of wealth where
the value function has high curvature. Once we have computed the value of
each alternative we pick the maximum, thus obtaining the policy rules for
the current period. Substituting these decision rules in the Bellman equation,
we obtain this periods value function (Vt(:)), which is then used to solve the
previous periods maximization problem. This process is iterated until t = 1.
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